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Abstract: 
Road safety has become an increasing concern in developed countries due to the significant 
amount of fatalities and the associated economic losses. Only in 2005 these losses rose to 
200,000 million euros, a considerable sum – approximately 2% of GDP – that easily 
justifies any public intervention. One measure taken by governments to address this issue is 
to enact stricter policies and regulations. Since drunk driving is one of the greatest concerns 
among public authorities in this field, several European countries have lowered their illegal 
Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) levels to 0.5 mg/ml during the last decade. This study is the 
first evaluation of the effectiveness of this transition using European panel-based data 
(CARE) for the period 1991-2003 with the differences-in-differences method in a fixed 
effects estimation that allows for any pattern of correlation (Cluster-Robust). The results 
reveal a positive impact on certain groups of road users and on the whole population when 
the policy is accompanied by enforcement interventions. Moreover, positive results 
appeared after a time lag of over two years. Finally, I state the importance of controlling for 
serial correlation in the evaluation of this type of  policy. 
 
Key words: Road Safety; Policy Evaluation; Differences-in-Differences; Drunk Driving; 
Illegal Blood Alcohol Content Levels (BAC) 
JEL Code: I18; H73; K32; R41. 
 
Resumen:  
La seguridad vial se ha convertido en una creciente preocupación en el mundo desarrollado 
por el gran número de víctimas mortales sufridas y por las pérdidas económicas que se 
derivan de ella. En el año 2005 éstas ascendieron a 200.000 millones de euros, una cantidad 
que supone el 2% del PIB europeo y que justifica la existencia de intervención pública. Los 
gobiernos se enfrentan a este reto fijando leyes y normativas más estrictas, especialmente 
en la lucha contra la conducción bajo los efectos del alcohol. La mayoría de países 
europeos decidieron a lo largo de la última década rebajar el nivel de alcohol en sangre 
permitido hasta 0.5 mg/ml. Este trabajo evalúa por primera vez la eficacia de esta transición 
usando un panel de datos europeo (CARE) mediante el método de Diferencias en 
Diferencias y efectos fijos permitiendo cualquier patrón de correlación (Cluster-Robust). 
Los resultados muestran la existencia de un impacto positivo sobre ciertos grupos, mientras 
que la efectividad sobre el conjunto de usuarios solo se consigue donde la reducción en el 
nivel de alcohol en sangre se acompaña de medidas que fuerzan su cumplimiento. Además, 
el trabajo encuentra un retardo superior a dos años en dicha eficacia. Finalmente, también 
se destaca la importancia de controlar por la autocorrelación, habitualmente olvidada en la 
evaluación de esta política. 
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1. Introduction. 
 In the 1997 programme to promote road safety the European Commission 
estimated annual losses associated with road accidents to be 45 billion euros.1 
This estimation increased following the expansion of the EU to 200 billion – 
approximately 2% of its GDP – in 2005.2 Two thirds of this total are spent on 
medical care, police intervention and vehicle repair. The remainder represents 
the loss of economic production caused by deaths and injuries. Therefore, this 
estimation provides a strong argument for governments to consider the 
reduction of road accidents as an economic objective and justifies the 
implementation of costly measures.  
 
 It is already demonstrated and socially accepted that alcohol consumption 
has a dramatic impact on the individual’s ability to drive. The European 
Commission considered in 2003 that at least 10,000 road users died every year 
in alcohol-related accidents, at a public cost of approximately 10 billion euros.3 
Consequently, governments try to discourage drunk driving by introducing 
specific regulations worldwide.  
 
One common policy implemented in developed countries has been to 
establish of lower illegal limits of blood alcohol content.4 This is a long-
standing policy, particularly in Europe, where it has undergone an inconsistent 
                                                 
1 COM (97) 131. Promotion of road safety in the European Union 1997-2001.  
2 More than 41,000 lives were lost and 1.9 million people were injured in that year, some of 
them severely, according to the EC Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. 
3 This estimation comes from the one million euros rule established in the European Road 
Safety Action Programme (1997), in which it was agreed that one life had a public value of 
one million euros. 
4 A BAC level is the number of grams of ethanol per litre of blood. 
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process of homogenisation since 1994.5 As of 1994, most former EU15 
countries lowered their illegal BAC limits, usually set at 0.8 mg/ml, to the level 
already established in other few countries: a BAC limit of 0.5 mg/ml. Since this 
process is almost complete, it is now time to evaluate its results. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of lowering illegal blood 
alcohol content limits to 0.5 mg/ml as a means to reduce road fatalities in 
Europe.  
 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, to my 
knowledge, this is the first evaluation of BAC policies that uses international 
panel-based data for the former EU15 countries. Secondly, this research aims to 
fill another gap, since few studies evaluate the transition from higher BAC 
limits to the new level of 0.5 mg/ml.6 Finally, the most recent and technically 
accurate studies which used differences-in-differences in panel-based data to 
evaluate BAC changes – Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) – did not consider 
serial correlation problems. This absence can generate a downward bias in 
standard errors that could overestimate the effectiveness of lowering BAC 
levels. Therefore, the latest contribution is to solve the problem by taking into 
account not only the heterogeneity caused by dealing with different countries, 
but also the existence of serial correlation.  
 
 Our main results show how lowering illegal BAC limits to 0.5 mg/ml has 
been an effective policy in saving lives in particular road-user groups in Europe. 
A strong impact has been observed among male drivers, particularly in urban 
areas, and on all drivers aged between 20 and 49. However, the effect of illegal 
                                                 
5 We call it an inconsistent process of homogenisation because some countries did not in fact 
lower the limit and still have an illegal BAC limit of 0.8 mg/ml. 
6 The literature was mainly focused in the American experience where several states lowered 
their illegal BAC levels to 0.8 mg/ml by the end of 1998. None of them established a lower 
limit. 
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BAC limits of 0.5 mg/ml are not found to be statistically significant for the 
whole population unless they are accompanied by specific enforcement 
activities such as random roadside checks. Moreover, the effectiveness of the 
policy is found to have a considerable time lag of over two years.  
 
 This study is organised as follows. In Section 2 I describe the evolution 
of the legislative process that led to the homogenisation of BAC limits and 
highlight the roles of national and European institutions. In Section 3 I 
introduce the related literature that has studied the effectiveness of setting and 
lowering BAC levels, focusing on the most recent and accurate studies that used 
panel-based data and differences-in-differences to evaluate results. In Sections 
4 and 5 I explain the methods, data and variables employed. In Section 6 I 
provide the main results while in Section 7 I state the importance of controlling 
for serial correlation in the evaluation of this policy. Finally, Section 8 contains 
the concluding remarks to the study. 
 
2. European and national legislation on BAC limits. 
 In Europe, the illegal blood alcohol content levels have always been 
established by national legislations. However, European institutions have not 
remained impassive and their concern was behind the 1988 EC Draft Directive 
to coordinate illegal BAC limits at 0.5 mg/ml in all member states.7 At that 
point, the only countries that included this limit in their national legislation 
were Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. The EC proposal for a 
common limit across member countries was intended to send a clear and 
coherent message to the Community as a whole but did not succeed because 
                                                 
7 COM (88) 707. The Commission explains that this level was chosen following several 
studies and took into account the public acceptance that the new limit would be effective in 
reducing the number of accidents.  
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several member states refused to observe the European legislation.8 Although 
the directive did not prosper, many member states with higher BAC limits 
decided to bring them into line with the level recommended by the Commission 
during the following decade, as shown in Table 1. Despite this, it would be 
naive to think that their decision was taken purely because of this frustrated 
directive, especially if we take into account that the first reforms were not 
undertaken until 1994. However, it is fair to consider the EC proposal as the 
first important attempt to achieve a general reduction of BAC limits to 0.5 
mg/ml across Europe. 
 
Table 1. Changes adopted in illegal BAC limits. EU15 (1991-2003). 
Country Changes in illegal BAC 
limits during 1991-2003 
BAC limit (mg/ml) in 2006 
Austria January 1998 0.5 
Belgium December 1994 0.5 
Denmark March 1998 0.5 
France July 1994 / August 1995 0.5 
Finland - 0.5 
Germany April 1998 0.5 
Greece March 1999 0.5 
Luxembourg - 0.8 
Ireland April 1994 0.8  
Italy July 2002 0.5 
Netherlands - 0.5 
Portugal - 0.5 
Spain May 1999 0.5 
Sweden - 0.2 
United Kingdom - 0.8 
 
 The first two countries that decided to reduce their BAC limits to the 
level proposed by the Commission were Belgium and France, in 1994 and 1995 
                                                 
8 This proposal was rejected by the Council of Transport Ministers in 1989 since the member 
states that opposed the proposal (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany) 
claimed that the Community had no power to enforce the legislation and no sound 
justification.  
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respectively. In April 1997, the European Commission launched a new 
programme to promote road safety in the European Union which included the 
revival of the 1988 draft.9 Again, the programme called for a reduction of the 
illegal BAC limits in those member states that still maintained levels above 0.5 
mg/ml, but in this case the legislation would be passed at a national level.10 This 
initiative was more successful than the 1988 draft because five countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Greece) decided to join to the 0.5 
mg/ml group during the first two active years of the programme, which was 
clear evidence of a convergence towards a common illegal BAC level.    
 
 The most recent attempt was made in 2001 when, still in the last year of 
the above programme, the European Commission published a recommendation 
that pursued the same objectives and included the reduction of illegal BAC 
limits as one of the most important measures to promote road safety. In this 
recommendation the Commission set the recommended BAC limit for the 
European Union at 0.5 mg/ml.11 Moreover, it pointed out that almost all 
members had already introduced the proposed limit. In these cases the 
Commission asked countries to continue the tendency and reduce the limit as 
much as possible. The remaining member states were invited to at least join the 
group at 0.5 mg/ml. Italy was the only remaining member that reduced its 
illegal BAC limit after the EC recommendation while Ireland, Luxemburg and 
the United Kingdom preferred to keep the limit at 0.8 mg/ml. Nevertheless, they 
are currently engaged in an ongoing public debate of the issue.12  
                                                 
9 Promotion of road safety in the European Union 1997-2001. COM(97)131. 
10 The Commission was probably aware of the opposition of some members to passing a new 
Directive. 
11 EC Recommendation 2001. Official diary L 43, 14/02/2001. 
12 In Table 1 we can observe that a change was introduced in Ireland twelve years ago. 
Ireland had a higher illegal BAC level before 1994 and decided to lower it to 0.8 mg/ml. 
Although there is some debate in the country about the benefits of lowering it again, no 
decision has been taken as yet.  
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 As a result of the above above, 12 member states of the former EU15 
now have a permitted BAC level equal to or lower than 0.5 mg/ml.13 Three 
countries had already met this condition before 1991 and eight introduced 
changes to their national legislation between 1991 and 2003 to enjoy the same 
situation.  
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that, in addition to the initiatives at EC and 
national level, a regional peer effect seems to have contributed to the expansion 
of the policy if we look at the chronology shown in Table 1. Limits were 
lowered to 0.5 mg/ml in Belgium and France between 1994 and 1996, while the 
Netherlands had already established this limit. Austria, Germany and Denmark 
also coordinated their limits during the same year. Finally, the Mediterranean 
countries – Greece, Spain and Italy – were the last group to reduce BAC limits 
and set the common BAC limit in 1999.14 The United Kingdom and Ireland 
never reduced their limits to the recommended value, whereas Sweden and 
Finland had maintained a strict policy with regard to low BAC limits for a long 
time prior to 1991. 
 
 In conclusion, we have seen how European countries have individually 
decided to set their illegal BAC limits to 0.5 mg/ml as part of the national 
legislation but inspired by the work of the European Commission. A peer effect 
between neighbouring countries also seems to have had an influence. This 
                                                 
13 The only country that established a lower BAC limit is Sweden which, having set a level of 
0.5 mg/ml in 1957, decided to implement a further reduction to 0.2 mg/ml in 1990. Portugal 
also reduced the limit in 2001 to enforce zero consumption, although after one year the 0.5 
mg/ml level was reinstated because of economic pressure and a lack of significant 
effectiveness. 
 
14 Spain and Greece also lowered their illegal BAC limits in 1999 to 0.5 mg/ml. Portugal and 
France already had this limit. 
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process, which began in the middle of the previous decade, has almost reached 
completion and only three countries have yet to join the initiative. 
 
3. Related literature. 
 Road accidents and their repercussions have long been addressed in 
economic literature. Recent studies usually aim to evaluate the effectiveness of 
public policies and regulations in reducing road fatalities. Mandatory seat belt 
laws, vehicle safety inspections or speed limits are some recurrent examples. 
However, in this study we focus on those policies and regulations aimed at 
reducing alcohol-related road fatalities. 
 
 It is socially accepted that alcohol consumption is one of the main 
determinants of road accidents. The economic and medical literature also 
supports this theory. Levitt and Porter (1999), Moskowitz and Fiorentino 
(2000), Zador et al. (2000), Compton et al. (2002) and Keall et al. (2004) are 
just some of the recent examples of scientific studies and medical reviews that 
prove the negative effects of alcohol consumption on driving ability. As a 
result, policies designed to combat the problem of drunk driving have become 
increasingly important in the last two decades and are a favourite target for 
policy evaluators.  
 
 Some researchers analysed several alcohol-related laws and facts. 
Baughman et al. (2001) and McCarthy (2003), for example, studied the 
importance of alcohol availability and alcohol access laws on road safety 
output. Saffer (1997) studied the role of alcohol advertising as a contributing 
factor in road fatalities while alcohol taxes were also studied by Ruhm (1996) 
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and Benson et al. (1999). Finally, Chaloupka and Saffer (1989) analysed the use 
of breath-testing as a deterrent against drunk driving.  
 
In addition to the above considerations, the minimum legal drinking age 
(MLDA) laws and illegal BAC limits are the two types of regulation most 
commonly addressed in the literature. The concern caused by the huge amount 
of alcohol-related accidents involving young drivers and recent regulatory 
changes in the USA could explain the particular importance that is now 
afforded to this type of legislation.15  
 
 The literature on the effectiveness of BAC changes has shown mixed 
results. As Eisenberg (2003) points out, this is unsurprising if we consider the 
limitations and varying levels of accuracy in these studies.16 Table 2 shows 
some of the most relevant previous studies. Most of these suffered from weak 
research design, small samples, comparison problems and limited data, which 
made it impossible to draw solid conclusions. Others analyse post-policy 
periods that are too short or fail to control for simultaneous policies that can 
influence the real effectiveness of lowering illegal BAC levels. In addition, few 
studies attempted to control for unobserved characteristics that can vary from 
one state to another by using a wide set of explanatory variables. However, it is 
impossible to capture all of the heterogeneity by including a large number of 
covariates. Therefore, none of the studies manages to make a robust evaluation 
of the issue due to at least one of the above problems. 
 
                                                 
15 Cook and Tauchen (1984), Asch and Levy (1990), DuMouchell et al. (1987), Saffer and 
Grossman (1987) and Wagenaar (1993) are just some of the interesting studies and reviews 
of the evaluation of changes to the MLDA in the USA. The results usually support the 
introduction of higher a MLDA. 
16 See Fell and Voas (2003) for a literature review on the evidence of lowering BAC laws. 
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 In contrast, Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) do not suffer from the same 
drawbacks and, to my knowledge, represent the most technically rigorous and 
accurate studies published to date. They use a large panel of annual state-level 
data covering the period 1982-2000 for US states and introduce fixed effects to 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity.17 Moreover, several concurrent policies 
(minimum legal drinking age, seatbelt laws, license revocation, etc.) are 
introduced in the analyses to avoid other contributing factors that could bias the 
estimates. Other time varying covariates such as unemployment and vehicle-
miles driven are also used. In both studies the results seem to bear out the 
effectiveness of lowering illegal BAC levels to 0.8 mg/ml in the USA.18 Dee 
(2001), for example, finds that the new illegal BAC level causes a reduction of 
7.2% in the total fatality rate, while Eisenberg (2003) observes a reduction of 
3.1% in the total fatal crashes. The policy seems to be particularly effective in 
reducing fatalities among young drivers, at weekends and at night. The last 
contribution made by Eisenberg (2003) was the evaluation of the time taken for 
the effects of the policies to be observed. He found that the effectiveness of the 
measures was noted after a significant delay of six years, which does not strictly 
contradict the main result but introduces some doubts about how the policy 
works. 
 
 Despite being the most relevant studies published to date, Dee (2001) and 
Eisenberg (2003) did not take into account the possible serial correlation that 
can arise when using differences-in-differences methods with a large panel and 
a highly time-correlated dependent variable. As a result, their estimates could 
                                                 
17 Cook and Tauschen (1984) and Evans and Graham (1988), to my knowledge, are probably 
the first studies to introduce fixed effects in the road safety literature. Ruhm (1996), for 
example, shows the goodness of this methodology in the evaluation of road safety measures. 
18 They also find the implementation of 1.0 BAC limits in places with no previous BAC 
legislation to be statistically effective. Eisenberg (2003) finds a higher effect associated with 
the 0.8 BAC level. 
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be downwardly biased – as is explained in Bertrand et al. (2004) – and 
overestimate the effectiveness of the policy. Later in this research I try to 
correct this problem by allowing for any pattern of correlation. 
 
 All of the above studies focus on the reduction of illegal BAC limits to 
the level of 0.8 mg/ml. This study attempts to evaluate the next step: the 
transition to 0.5 mg/ml. Unfortunately, there is far less literature available on 
0.5 BAC limits. Essentially, a large proportion of these studies are simply 
national or regional reports that support the reduction of illegal BAC limits by 
comparing pre-post statistical data. Other scientific studies exhibit the same 
technical limitations as mentioned for the above studies of the 0.8 mg/ml limit. 
From this group of studies of the 0.5 mg/ml BAC limit, several should be 
mentioned, including Henstridge et al. (1997) for Australia, Bartl and Esberger 
(2000) for Austria, Bernhoft (2003) for Denmark, Mercier-Guyon (1998) for 
France, and finally Noordzij (1994) for the Netherlands. None of these works 
uses an international European panel to study this transition, which means that 
the present research can fill an important gap in the evaluation of such an 
interesting policy. 
 
 To conclude this section, I wish to highlight the main contributions of 
this study to the literature: firstly, this research is the first to estimate the effect 
of lowering illegal BAC limits in Europe by using panel-based data from 
former EU15 countries and fixed effects; secondly, it is the first study to take 
into account serial correlation in estimating the effect of changes to illegal BAC 
limits, which prevents the overestimation that commonly affected previous 
studies.19 
                                                 
19 However, this is not the first study to control for serial correlation in the road safety 
literature. Dee and Sela (2003) was, to our knowledge, the first study that used this 
estimation strategy in evaluating speed limit changes in the USA. 
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Table 2. Previous literature evaluating the 0.8 mg/ml BAC limits. 
Study Location Results 
 
NHTSA (1991) 
 
State of California (USA) 
 
12% reduction in alcohol-related fatalities 
 
NHTSA (1994) 
 
Five States (USA) 
 
Significant reductions in alcohol involvement 
 
Johnson and 
 Fell (1995) 
 
Five States (USA) 
 
 Significant reductions in alcohol-related 
 fatal crashes in 4 states 
 
Rogers (1995) 
 
State of California (USA) 
 
Mixed Results 
 
OTS (1995) 
 
State of California (USA) 
 
Mixed results 
 
Hingson et al. (1996) 
 
Five States (USA) 
 
Reduction in alcohol involvement 
 
Foss et al. (1998) 
 
State of North Caroline 
 (USA) 
 
No clear effects 
 
Apsler et al. (1999) 
 
11 States (USA) 
 
Significant reduction in alcohol  
involvement only in two states 
 
Hingson et al. (2000) 
 
Six States (USA) 
 
6% reduction in alcohol-related fatal crashes 
 
Voas et al. (2000) 
 
50 States and District of 
Columbia (USA) 
 
Reduction in alcohol involvement  
 
Shults et al. (2001) 
 
50 States (USA) 
 
 7% reduction in measures of alcohol-related 
fatal crashes 
 
Dee (2001) 
 
48 States (USA) 
 
7.2% reduction in the total fatality rate 
 
Eisenberg (2003) 
 
50 States and District of 
Columbia (USA) 
 
3.1% reduction in fatal crash rate 
    Source: Table adapted from Fell and Voas (2003). NHTSA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (USA).  
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4. Empirical strategy. 
 This study uses several fatality rates for the former EU15 members for 
the period 1991-2003 to evaluate the impact of reducing illegal BAC limits in 
some countries. The method chosen is a slight extension of the differences-in-
differences estimation procedure specified as a two-way fixed effects model 
that takes the following form: 
                                      Yst = Xst β + δ Zst + ws + vt + εst   (1) 
 
where Yst is the chosen dependent variable (fatality rate), Xst contains the vector 
of time-varying control covariates and Zst is the policy dummy variable being 
evaluated; ws and vt are state-specific and year-specific fixed effects and εst is a 
mean-zero random error. State fixed effects control for time-invariant state-
specific omitted variables and year dummies control for national trends. The 
key element of this difference-in-difference model is the parameter δ, which 
measures the difference between the average change in the fatality rates of the 
treatment group (countries that have a BAC level of 0.5 mg/ml or lower at some 
point during the period studied) and the average change in the fatality rates of 
the control group (those countries that maintained a higher BAC level).  
 
Specifically: 
 
δ = [ E(YA / G = 1) – E(YB / G = 1)] - [ E(YA / G = 0) – E(YB / G = 0)]   (2) 
 
where YB and YA denote the road fatality rate before and after the reform and G 
= 1 and G = 0 denote treatment and control group observations, respectively.  
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 One of the most basic assumptions of differences-in-differences models 
is that the temporal effect in the two groups of states is the same in the absence 
of intervention. This is called the fundamental identifying assumption and is 
described as the equality between average changes in the two groups in the pre-
treatment period. Like Galiani, Gertler and Schargrosdky (2005), this study 
tests for the equality between average changes in the two groups in the pre-
treatment period to assess the plausibility of the fundamental identifying 
assumption. This type of test is notable for its absence from the literature in 
which differences-in-differences are used.  
 
 The strategy consists in considering only the pre-treatment years from 
each treated country, excluding observations from treated years. In addition, the 
observations from each control country for the whole period are added.20 Once 
the observations of interest have been determined equation (1) is estimated, but 
now with two important changes. First, separate time dummies are used for 
treatment and control countries as they allow us to check whether the time 
trends in the pre-treatment period were the same; second, the policy dummy 
variable is omitted. Hence, the final estimated model is the following: 
 
                          Yst = Xst β + ws + v Ct  + v Tt   + εst                                           (3) 
 
where v Ct  and v Tt  denote year-specific fixed effects for control and treated 
countries respectively. In this case, t covers the period from 1991 to the last pre-
treatment year in the case of treatment countries (T) and to 2003 for control 
countries (C). The results of the test tell us that we cannot statistically reject the 
hypothesis of having the same time trends in the pre-treatment period for 
                                                 
20 The whole period can be used for the control countries because some countries that still 
maintain high BAC limits (United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg) did not change the 
relevant legislation during the period considered.  
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control and treatment groups and, according to Heckman and Hotz (1989), this 
validates the main differences-in-differences identifying assumption. The 
results of this test can be found in the appendix (A1). 
 
 Another concern when using differences-in-differences to evaluate the 
impact of a given policy on heterogeneous individuals is to ensure that there is 
no endogeneity that may bias the policy effects. Bertrand et al. (2004) points 
out that differences-in-differences models can prevent many of these 
endogeneity problems but that they may still constitute an important limitation. 
As Besley and Case (2000) states, policy change is purposeful action and can 
rarely be treated as experimental data. Therefore, further research is needed to 
understand the motives behind the respective policies of each studied case.  
 
 In the present case it is not possible to test a policy equation, but we can 
attempt to determine whether there is any pattern in the evolution of fatality 
rates and the decision to lower illegal BAC levels. It would be reasonable to 
assume that those countries which adopted the policy may have recorded high 
fatality rates in their recent past.  
 
The rates of variation constructed taking into account the last pre-
treatment years for each country are shown in Table 3 and indicate that we 
cannot clearly identify the pattern. In fact, only a few countries set new illegal 
BAC levels after recording positive rates of variation in the last pre-treatment 
years. However, it is true that the rate of change observed for the last pre-
treatment year is slightly lower than the annual average change since 1991 in 
most of the countries studied. Nevertheless, all countries except Spain and 
Greece show good results for the last two years, which suggests that 
governments are unlikely to have considered what happened in the most recent 
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period to be an important trend change. Moreover, only Austria and Spain 
recorded a dramatic rise in the fatality rate in the last pre-treatment year. 
Consequently, it seems to be an over-generalisation to believe that BAC limits 
were lowered because of major incidents in the period immediately prior to the 
change. 
 
Table 3. Rates of change in the fatality rate before the introduction of the 
0.5 mg/ml BAC limit (treated countries). 
 
Country 
 
Change Last 
Year1 
Change Last Two 
Years2 
Annual Average 
 Change since 19913 
Austria 7% -9% -6% 
Belgium -1% -12% -6% 
Denmark -5% -17% -4% 
Germany -3% -10% -5% 
Greece 3% 1% 0% 
Spain 6% 8% -5% 
France -2% -10% -5% 
Italy 0% 5% -2% 
 1. Change in the fatality rate observed in the last year before setting the 0.5 BAC limit. 
 2. Change in the fatality rate observed in the last two years before setting the 0.5 BAC limit. 
 3. Average rate of variation in the fatality rate from 1991 until the year in which the limit was introduced. 
 
 Two other possible explanations are the peer effect expansion and the 
role of the European Union and its campaign against road fatalities. The 
detailed description of the legal chronology given in the previous section shows 
a probable regional influence on the decision to set new illegal BAC limits. 
However, we cannot overlook the involvement of the European Commission 
and its programme to promote road safety launched in 1997, which proposed 
the 0.5 BAC limit and was followed by several countries. The two explanations 
do not represent an endogeneity problem and cannot lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
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 In the last effort to overcome the problem of endogeneity, I follow the 
strategy of Eisenberg (2003) and check the time pattern with which the effects 
of the policy were noted with respect to the date of adoption. This is intended to 
address unobserved factors like attitude shifts that can be partly responsible for 
the enactment of stricter policies. This test consists of the same basic model (1) 
introduced above but which now considers binary variables related to the length 
of time from the year in which the policy was adopted instead of the policy 
dummy. The results of the test can be found in the appendix (A2) and show that 
no significant time patterns can be observed before the enactment of the new 
policy.  
 
 Finally, Bertrand et al. (2004) find that most studies that employ 
differences-in-differences estimation ignore serial correlation problems even 
when they use data from a large number of years and dependent variables that 
are likely to be serially correlated.21 We cannot forget that the estimated effect 
of the policy is the common OLS estimate. This generates standard errors that 
severely underestimate the standard deviation of the differences-in-differences 
estimator in the presence of serial correlation. In order to correct this bias 
Bertrand et al. (2004) propose different solutions that are applied according to 
the characteristics of the sample. Given the number of states in this study, the 
method that performs better according to their Monte Carlo simulations is to 
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix.22 Therefore, the results 
shown below take into account not only heteroskedasticity but also serial 
correlation within states, and this represents a significant difference between 
this study and the most advanced literature focused on the evaluation of BAC 
                                                 
21 Three contributing factors can be found in Bertrand et al. (2004): long time series, serial 
correlated dependent variables and a treatment variable that changes very little within a state 
over time.  
22 See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a summary of their Monte Carlo simulations for different 
numbers of states. 
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laws.23 As is well known, this method is based on the estimation of the 
variance-covariance matrix allowing for all arbitrary of correlation. This 
estimator takes the following form: 
      
                   V = (X’X)-1 (∑
=
N
i 1
ui’ui) (X`X)-1              (4) 
  ui = ∑
=
T
t 1
eit xit 
 
where V is the variance-covariance estimator, X is the matrix of independent 
variables, N is the number of groups (states), eit is the state-year specific 
residual and xit is the vector of independent variables.24, 25 
 
Having carried out all of these checks to prevent possible obstacles and 
problems, in the following section I shall explain the data and variables used to 
estimate the model presented. 
 
5. Data and variables employed. 
 This research is based on the European database CARE (Community 
database on Accidents on the Roads in Europe), which started collecting data in 
1993 and provides information on annual road casualties reported by the 
countries that make up the EU25.26 The EC created this Community database on 
road safety outputs (fatality Rates, total Fatalities, total Injuries, etc.) in order to 
                                                 
23 The same strategy is used by Dee and Sela (2003) in the evaluation of changes in speed 
limits, as mentioned in note 15.  
24 In fact, this is known as the White-like formula to compute standard errors (White, 1984). 
Also see Arellano (1987) for a more in-depth understanding. 
25 Since this method is only valid asymptotically, we apply the finite sample adjustment used 
by STATA: N-1/(N-k) * M/(M-1), where N is the number of observations, k the number of 
regressors including the constant and M the number of clusters.  
26 This database can be consulted on-line at: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/roadsafety 
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identify and quantify road safety problems in Europe.27 Therefore, CARE 
contains state-level data for the period from 1991 to 2004 for the EU25 
countries. However, we are interested here in the homogenisation of illegal 
BAC limits which occurred during the last decade, just before the enlargement 
of the European Union. For this reason I use only data related to the former 
EU15 countries. In addition, I only use data up for the period until 2003 
because the rest of the variables are not always available for that final year. As 
a result, the sample in this study is based on 15 countries over a period of 13 
years for the total fatality rates (195 observations).  
 
 The most useful characteristic of the CARE database is its high level of 
disaggregation, which makes it possible to use different fatality rates taken from 
several victim groups. The available groups are divided according to gender, 
age, area and type of road user (driver, passenger or pedestrian). Unfortunately, 
CARE does not contain disaggregated data for Germany. Therefore, 14 
countries are used in the analysis of disaggregated dependent variables (182 
observations).  
 
 The rest of the variables are found in international databases such as 
Eurostat, WHO Europe, World Bank Development Indicators and the World 
Road Statistics. The policy variables used are found in national and European 
reports. Table 4 shows the explanatory variables used in this research and their 
descriptive statistics for the whole sample.  
 
 Several dependent variables are used depending on the age group and 
gender of the victims and the areas where they were killed. These dependent 
variables are simply the fatality rates per 100,000 inhabitants in each population 
                                                 
27 Council Decision 93/704/EC. 
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group or the fatality rate per 100,000 km driven.28 Unfortunately, CARE does 
not contain the latter type. To compensate for this absence and compare the two 
rates – at least for the aggregated rates – I use data that are available in the 
WHO database for Europe.29  
 
 Before considering the control variables it is worth noting that the 
inclusion of a large number of socioeconomic covariates removes the 
confounding factors that can bias the impact of the policy by keeping them 
constant and can also provide a better understanding of which factors may 
influence the number of road fatalities in Europe.  
 
 In Ruhm (1996) we saw that macroeconomic variables can help to 
improve the present estimation, since road fatalities and alcohol consumption 
are usually procyclical.30 To account for the economic cycle I include 
unemployment and economic growth rates.  
 
 In addition to macroeconomic variables, I include more covariates that 
are related to transport and the use of vehicles. These variables are motorisation 
and vehicle-km. I also include infrastructure variables to account for the 
possible effect of road quality and characteristics on driving. These variables 
are motorways and national roads (% of the total road network) and are not 
usually included in the literature. The educational background of the population 
between 15 and 64 years old is also taken into account as an additional 
socioeconomic covariate. 
 
                                                 
28 According to Eisenberg (2003), the literature traditionally uses these fatality rates as output 
measures because of their accuracy and importance for policy makers. 
29 World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (HFA-DB Database). 
30 See Evans and Graham (1988) and Ruhm (1995) for a more in-depth discussion of these 
relationships. 
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 The last group of covariates is made up of the binary regulatory variables. 
Ruhm (1996), Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) show that it is important to 
introduce different laws related to road fatalities in order to prevent the 
confounding effects that may arise in the evaluation of a particular policy if 
other legal reforms were undertaken simultaneously. The minimum legal 
drinking age (MLDA) and the points license are therefore introduced as 
potentially simultaneous policies. The first takes a value of 1 for states in years 
when there is a clear minimum legal drinking age for purpose and non-purpose 
drinking for all alcoholic beverages, and 0 otherwise. The second covariate 
takes a value of 1 in state-years in which the system of points-based driving 
licenses is in effect, and 0 otherwise. Although other potentially relevant 
policies could be included, it is important to maintain a degree of freedom. The 
choice of these two policies is arbitrary but follows the general criteria of being 
comparable across states, manageable given the differences in national 
legislations, and affected by within-group variation in some countries for the 
period studied. Additionally, policies that were uniformly identified in the 
literature as having no impact on road fatalities or present mixed results were 
discarded. The use of the points license as a simultaneous policy variable is 
particularly interesting because it is essentially a European policy that has been 
introduced recently in some countries and which has not been studied in depth 
as yet.  
 
 Finally, the key policy variable that is expected to be essential in 
evaluating the effectiveness of lowering legal limits of blood alcohol content is 
called BAC0.5. This variable takes a value of 1 in states and years when a 
country has an illegal BAC limit of 0.5 mg/ml or lower, and 0 when this limit is  
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Table 4. Explanatory variables. Definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
Description Mean S.D. 
Unemployment  
Rate 
Unemployment rate in %. 8.748 4.296 
Growth Rate 
Rate of change (%) of the real GDP, 
 PPP$ per capita. 
2.750 2.617 
Motorization Number of passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants. 418.536 93.768 
Vehicle-km 
driven 
Annual number of passenger cars-km expressed  
in billion km and weighted by the national 
population. 
9.146 2.452 
  Upper 
Secondary 
Education 
% population between 16-64 years old  
with upper secondary education. 55.911 18.270 
Motorways 
Proportion in % of motorways (km) in the  
total road network. 
1.312 0.935 
National Roads 
Proportion in % of national roads (km) in the  
total road network. 
8.942 5.105 
Minimum Legal 
Drinking Age 
Binary variable: 1 for purpose and non-purpose 
minimum legal drinking age for all beverages.  
0 Otherwise. 
0.592 0.491 
Points License 
Binary variable: 1 for countries with a driving  
license governed by a points system. 
 0 Otherwise. 
0.174 0.377 
Random Checks 
Binary variable: 1 for countries that allow random 
breath or blood tests on the road.  
0 Otherwise. 
0.779 0.416 
BAC05 
Binary variable: 1 countries with an illegal BAC 
limit of  0.5 mg/ml or lower.  
0 for higher illegal BAC limits. 
0.504 0.495 
BAC05 +    
Random Checks 
Binary variable: 1 for countries that allow random 
checks and maintain an illegal BAC level of  
0.5 mg/ml.  
0 Otherwise. 
0.496 0.497 
 
higher.31 A fractional correction is applied for cases in which the policy was 
implemented at some point during the same year. Dee (2001) explains that it is 
not only important to control for the policy of evaluation, but also for the level 
                                                 
31 It is important to point out that Sweden, for example, has a BAC limit of 0.2 mg/ml for the 
whole time series and Portugal has the same BAC limit in 2001. These facts justify the 
decision to control for BAC levels of 0.5 mg/ml or lower. 
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of enforcement that exists. The variable Random Checks is therefore used to 
control for the enforcement of this policy. Random Checks identifies countries 
that authorise and carry out random breath tests on the road. In addition, I also 
create a new binary explanatory variable that is formed by the interaction 
between lowered BAC limits and random checks to record whether the policy 
has a different impact when accompanied by a reasonable level of enforcement 
activity. 
 
 It is interesting to note that alcohol consumption is not included in this 
part of the study, despite its obviously strong impact on road fatalities, because 
it is directly affected by the regulation under evaluation. It is suggested later in 
the paper that the success of lowering BAC levels may be due mainly to the 
effect of this change on alcohol consumption in the studied countries. 
 
6. Main results. 
 The estimation results for the total fatality rates are shown in Table 5. 
Specifications (1) and (2) show that the coefficients associated with the 0.5 
mg/ml BAC limit are not significant for either the total fatality rate per unit 
population or the total fatality rate per km driven. In contrast, when the key 
policy variable is the interaction between BAC limits and Random Checks in 
models (3) and (4), there is a significant negative impact, even at a 5% 
significance level in the latter model. This suggests that lowering BAC levels 
does not have a global impact unless the regulation is enforced in practice by 
random road checks. Therefore, when these two regulatory measures are 
combined both fatality rates seem to decrease considerably. The fatality rate per 
unit population decreases by 4.3%, while the fatality rate per km driven falls 
6.1%. 
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 Macroeconomic variables do not seem to have a strong influence on road 
fatalities in Europe. Only growth rates seem to have an impact on fatality rates 
with specifications (1) and (3), but their significance decreases when the 
dependent variable is the fatality rate per km driven, as shown in models (2) and 
(4). Unemployment rates also seem to have no significant impact. Therefore, 
while the procyclical effect of road fatalities cannot be ruled out, it does seem to 
be weaker than expected. 
 
 In contrast, the coefficient associated with the level of motorisation in the 
respective countries is highly significant in all specifications. It is worth noting 
that its negative sign can be explained by the level of transport development in 
the country. There is a significant negative correlation between development 
and number of accidents, since more developed countries usually have better 
infrastructures, safer cars, clearer regulations and a greater frequency of police 
intervention. Therefore, the number of cars per 1000 inhabitants may be 
considered as a proxy for the level of transport development.  
 
 Interesting results are obtained regarding the road infrastructure 
variables. The coefficient associated with motorways – the best type of road and 
therefore the safest – is always strongly significant across all specifications and 
has a negative sign. Moreover, national roads – roads of lesser quality than 
motorways but on which drivers still travel at high speeds – have a positive sign 
and a significant coefficient in models (2) and (4). This result suggests that the 
quality and characteristics of the road system also influence the success of BAC 
policies. 
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Table 5. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. Total fatality rates. 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
TFR 
per 100,000 
population 
(1) 
TFR 
per 100,000  
km driven 
(2) 
TFR 
per 100,000 
population 
(3) 
TFR 
 per 100,000  
km driven 
(4) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
-0.0339  
  (0.0271) 
 
-0.0429   
(0.0338) 
- - 
 
Random Checks 
 
-0.0040    
(0.0758) 
 
0.0861    
(0.0731) 
- - 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.0426*   
 (0.0228) 
 
-0.0612**  
  (0.0220) 
 
Points License 
 
0.00556    
(0.0411) 
 
-0.0618   
 (0.0533) 
 
0.0072   
(0.0402) 
 
-0.0612   
 (0.0503) 
 
MLDA 
 
-0.0121   
(0.0215) 
 
0.0059   
 (0.0235) 
 
-0.0102    
(0.0197) 
 
0.0064   
 (0.0197) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0032    
(0.0030) 
 
0.0009   
 (0.0039) 
 
-0.0032   
 (0.0032) 
 
0.0009   
 (0.0044) 
 
Growth rate 
 
0.0091*   
 (0.0049) 
 
0.0064  
  (0.0059) 
 
0.0093*    
(0.0046) 
 
0.0057   
 (0.0054) 
 
Motorization 
 
-0.0019**   
 (0.0006) 
 
-0.0040***   
 (0.0003) 
 
-0.0019***  
 (0.0006) 
 
-0.0041***   
(0.0003) 
 
Vehicle-km 
 
0.0381   
(0.0436) 
 
- 
 
0.0381    
(0.0433) 
 
- 
 
 Upper Sec. 
Education 
 
0.0046   
(0.0030) 
 
0.0065*   
 (0.0036) 
 
0.0045*    
 (0.0024) 
 
0.0072**   
 (0.0032) 
 
Motorways 
 
-0.0478***    
(0.0103) 
 
-0.0464***   
 (0.0124) 
 
-0.0455***    
(0.0099) 
 
-0.0372***   
(0.0109) 
 
National Roads 
 
0.0033   
 (0.0023) 
 
0.0040*  
 (0.0021) 
 
0.0032 
   (0.0022) 
 
0.0032*    
(0.0017) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
 
0.80 
 
0.93 
 Standard errors are given in parenthesis to allow for clustering by country. Each model also includes time and state fixed 
 effects and a constant term.* Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at  5% level and *** at 1% level. 
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Finally, the upper secondary education variable is significant in all 
models except specification (1) and has a positive impact. One possible 
explanation is that more educated people tend to travel more often and have 
more leisure time. This would act as a proxy for income, which, in the 
literature, is generally found to be positively related to accidents because of the 
positive correlation between income and both alcohol consumption and vehicle 
use.  
 
 Recent studies on road fatalities such as Eisenberg (2003), Dee and Sela 
(2003) and Grabowsky and Morrisey (2004), have analysed the impact of road 
safety measures on different victim groups. I also follow this strategy by 
dividing victims into groups according to age and gender. With the CARE 
database it is also possible to include the difference between urban and non-
urban fatalities to establish in which type of area the policy has been most 
effective. Table 6 shows the results of applying specifications (1) and (3) to 
each age group. Lowering BAC limits seems to be effective for people aged 
between 20 and 49. A reduction of approximately 10.5% is found in the number 
of victims aged between 20 and 40 and a reduction of 8% is found for the 40-
50-year-old age group. Older groups do not seem to be affected by the change 
in the policy.  
 
Table 7 shows the results for gender groups and areas.32 Men seem to be 
affected by the policy, which causes a decrease of 5.7% in the corresponding 
fatality rate for this gender group. In contrast, the policy seems to have no 
impact on the number of female fatalities, possibly because this group already 
showed a higher level of compliance with existing laws. 
                                                 
32 Models (1) and (3) are also applied here but Motorways and national roads are dropped out 
when we study urban fatalities. 
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Table 6. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. Age group fatality 
rates (selected results). 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Age Group 
20-29 
(5) 
Age Group 
30-39 
(6) 
Age Group 
40-49 
(7) 
Age Group 
50-59 
(8) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
  -0.1050*   
 (0.0515) 
 
  -0.1043**    
(0.0400) 
 
  -0.0819*  
  (0.0422) 
 
 
-0.0965    
 (0.0656) 
 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
     -0.0992*  
  (0.052) 
 
 
-0.1077**  
  (0.0396) 
 
-0.0823* 
  (0.0417) 
 
-0.0862 
 (0.0620) 
     
 
Independent 
variables 
Age Group 
60-69 
(9) 
Age Group 
70-79 
(10) 
Age Group 
+70 
(11) 
Age Group 
+ 80 
(12) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
0.0153    
(0.0638) 
 
0.0378 
(0.035) 
 
-0.0767    
(0.0968) 
 
-0.0068   
 (0.0842) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
0.0170  
 (0.0651) 
 
 
0.0424   
 (0.0332) 
 
-0.0680    
 (0.0829) 
 
0.0075    
(0.0877) 
 Each model include the rest of the explanatory variables, time and state dummy variables and a constant term. Standard 
errors allowing for clustering by country are given in parenthesis.  
 
 When we introduce the area in which the accident occurred, no difference 
is observed until this information is combined with gender, which in turn 
indicates that only one group is affected by the policy: men in urban areas. The 
estimated decrease in fatalities is 9.5 or 10.9%, depending on the BAC variable 
used, as shown in Table 7. However, no impact is observed in non-urban areas. 
This could be explained by the fact that non-urban fatalities can be caused by 
other problems that are more closely related to speed, tiredness and road 
characteristics. These factors are more likely to influence non-urban driving, 
since in urban areas vehicles generally travel at lower speeds and the 
characteristics of the roads are more homogeneous.  
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Table 7. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. 
Gender and area fatality rates (selected results). 
 
 Each model includes the rest of the explanatory variables, time and state dummy variables and a constant term. Standard 
errors allowing for clustering by country are given in parenthesis. The variable Motorways is excluded from the models that 
treat urban road fatalities. 
 
Finally, I evaluated a new combination of age groups and area but, as 
shown in the Appendix (A3 and A4), no stable results are found, with the 
exception of young groups in urban areas, where the policy is seen to have a 
strong impact. Table 8 shows the results for the young age group by area. 
 
 After identifying the affected groups, the next interesting aspect is the 
time-scale in which the effects of the policy are produced. Eisenberg (2003) 
introduced this analysis in the literature and found a significant lag of at least 
six years. In the present study I replicate the strategy by using binary time  
 
Independent 
Variables 
Male 
Total Fatalities 
(13) 
Female 
Total Fatalities 
(14) 
Non-Urban  
Total Fatalities 
(15) 
Urban 
Total Fatalities 
(16) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
-0.0573*  
 (0.0317) 
 
 
-0.0250 
(0.0407) 
 
-0.0362 
(0.0573) 
 
-0.0470   
(0.0413) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
-.0574*   
 (0.0313) 
 
-0.0232    
(0.0394) 
 
-0.0310   
 (0.0425) 
 
-0.0678  
 (0.0405) 
     
 
Independent 
Variables 
Male 
Non-Urban  
Fatalities 
(17) 
Male 
Urban 
Fatalities 
(18) 
Female 
Non-Urban  
Fatalities 
(19) 
Female 
Urban  
Fatalities 
(20) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
-0.0470 
(0.0361) 
 
-.0959**    
(0.0419) 
 
 
-0.0362   
 (0.0573) 
 
-0.0205   
 (0.0603) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
-0.0351   
(0.0402) 
 
-0.1094** 
(0.0463) 
 
-0.0240    
(0.0601) 
 
-0.0240    
(0.0601) 
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Table 8. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. 
Age group 20-29 and area fatality rates (selected results). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Two-way fixed effects estimation. The model includes a constant term and the rest of the covariates  
                          used in previous specifications, with the exception of infrastructure variables in the case of urban  
                          fatality rate. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
variables instead of the 0.5 BAC policy. These new dummies are constructed as 
time intervals that account for the time elapsed after the new legislation was 
adopted. Because of data constraints I define two periods. The first, which takes 
value one in state-years from 0 to 2 years after the enactment and zero 
otherwise, is thought to identify short-term effects. The second, which takes 
value one from the third year after policy introduction and zero otherwise, 
captures the long-term effects. Therefore, the procedure is only applied to those 
models in which the 0.5 BAC policy was observed to be effective in the 
previous estimations. 
 
 The results shown in Table 9 seem to suggest that lowering BAC levels 
is not generally effective in the short term. It seems that a period of more than 
two years is required before the effects of the policy are observed. A short-term 
effect can be observed among mal drivers in urban areas, but the coefficient for 
the long-term period is also significantly higher. Although a significant delay is 
observed, the results of this study are less surprising than the 6-year delay 
obtained by Eisenberg (2003). However, it must be recognised that these results 
only imply that the policy can start to have an effect in the third year, and it is 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Non-Urban  
Age 20-29 
(25) 
Urban  
Age 20-29 
(21) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
 
-0.0341     
 (0.0561) 
 
    -0.2830**   
 (0.0972) 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
 
-0.0341     
(0.0561) 
 
    -0.2947**   
 (0.1031) 
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impossible to be certain that the effects are not produced later due to the time 
intervals I have used. 
 
 In summary, we have seen that lowering illegal BAC limits has proved to 
be an effective policy for the whole population when it is accompanied by 
random road checks. Moreover, in disaggregated cases, we have determined 
that male and young drivers, particularly in urban areas, are clearly affected by 
the policy. The remaining drivers, aged between 30 and 49, also indicate a 
positive impact of the lower BAC levels. However, the effectiveness of the 
policy is not usually apparent in the short term. The other victim groups do not 
seem to benefit from the policy. 
 
Table 9. Time delay in the effectiveness of lowering illegal BAC levels 
(selected results). 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Total Fatalities 
 
(21) 
 
Males 
 
(22) 
Males in Urban 
Areas 
 
(23) 
 
After  0-2 years 
 
0.0059 
(0.0234) 
 
-0.0141           
(0.0287) 
 
-0.0730**    
(0.0327) 
 
After +3 years 
 
-0.0455* 
(0.0256) 
 
-0.0683**    
(0.0299) 
 
-0.1013*    
(0.0485) 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Age Group 
20-29 
(24) 
 
Age Group 
30-39 
(25) 
 
Age Group 
40-49 
(26) 
 
After  0-2 years 
 
-0.0543 
(0.0469) 
 
-0.0288   
 (0.0250) 
 
-0.0149   
 (0.0506) 
 
After +3 years 
 
-0.1322** 
(0.0505) 
 
-0.1568***  
(0.0515) 
 
-0.0923**    
(0.0413) 
  The same previous models are applied substituting the BAC policy variables with time interval dummies. Cluster-robust     
 standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1%  
 level. 
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7. Serial correlation treatment. 
 In Section 5 I argued that disregarding the effect of serial correlation can 
sometimes lead to overly optimistic estimates of the effectiveness of the policy 
using differences-in-differences methods. Consequently, I provide some 
evidence of this here by determining the results I would have obtained if 
ignoring serial correlation and basing the estimation only on heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors, as was the case in previous studies.  
 
 Table 10 shows the results of this estimation serves as a comparison with 
Table 5. In the hypothetical, the reduction of BAC levels would have appeared 
to be effective even in countries without random road checks, while we have 
seen that the policy is only effective when accompanied by random checks. In 
addition, the coefficient associated with the low BAC policy becomes more 
significant in those estimations that include an interaction variable that 
identifies policy and enforcement simultaneously (BAC05+Random Checks). 
The remaining variables do not change significantly.  
 
 When the same strategy is applied to the rest of the fatality rates, those 
that were shown to be affected in Section 6 now have even more statistically 
significant coefficients associated with the BAC policy. However, the only 
fatality rate to change that was not previously affected is that of urban fatalities, 
while it has been demonstrated the benefits of the policy in these areas are 
observed only in male drivers. The remaining fatality rates do not change and 
lead to the same interpretations as in Section 6. 
  
 These examples highlight the importance of controlling for serial 
correlation in order to avoid misleading interpretations when evaluating public 
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policies using differences-in-differences in large panels. In the case studied 
here, few errors would be created by disregarding serial correlation but they 
would be sufficient to confound some effects.  
 
Table 10. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models for total fatality 
rates. White-robust estimation (selected results). 
 
Independent 
variables 
TFR 
 per 100,000  
Population 
(27) 
TFR 
 per 100,000  
km driven 
(28) 
TFR 
per 100,000 
Population 
(29) 
 
TFR 
per 100,000  
km driven 
(30) 
 
 
BAC0.5 
 
   -0.0339*  
  (0.0271) 
 
  -0.0429*  
 (0.0338) 
- - 
 
Random Checks 
 
-0.0040    
 (0.0758) 
 
0.0861    
(0.0731) 
- - 
 
BAC0.5 + 
Random Checks 
 
- 
 
- 
 
  -0.0426**    
(0.0228) 
 
   -0.0612***   
(0.0220) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
 
0.81 
 
0.93 
   Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are given in parenthesis. Each model also includes time and state  
   fixed effects, the rest of the covariates and the constant term. 
 
8. Concluding remarks.  
 The lowering of illegal BAC levels to 0.5 mg/ml has proved to be an 
effective policy in Europe. However, some further discussion is required. As 
has been demonstrated in this paper, the policy is not found to be effective for 
all road users in a country unless it is actively enforced, which is highlighted as 
an important procedure in any policy or regulatory change. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the policy is heterogeneous depending on the age, gender and 
area of the victim group. Therefore, this can be used by policy-makers as an 
indication of which groups are more likely to be affected by this and other 
policies related to drunk driving. However, we have seen that there is usually a 
 34
delay of more than two years before the positive influence of the policy can be 
observed, which rules out a short-term effect. Further research is needed to 
understand this time lag.33  
 
 It is also important to point out that although the enactment of the policy 
was found to have positive effects, a cost-benefit analysis is essential in order to 
determine whether this policy is economically viable. We cannot forget that 
changing the behaviour of the public in this case can generate a negative impact 
on several sectors (alcoholic beverages industry, bars and restaurants, 
nightclubs, etc.).34 Therefore, we should make sure that predicted costs do not 
exceed the economic benefits obtained by the policy before recommending this 
policy to those European countries that still maintain higher illegal BAC limits. 
This analysis is left for future research.  
 
 We have seen the importance of allowing for any pattern of correlation in 
this kind of estimation in order to avoid misleading interpretations that could 
affect the degree of effectiveness derived from the analysis. Consequently, I 
give strong arguments and evidence in favour of reviewing the estimates made 
in previous literature on BAC policies.35 By overcoming the problem this 
research makes a new and useful contribution to the literature.  
  
 Finally, I consider that a preliminary debate on the various effects of the 
policy against drunk driving needs to be launched. This research was motivated 
by the assumption that by lowering BAC levels it would be possible to reduce 
                                                 
33 See Eisenberg (2003). 
34 This negative impact can be translated into lower alcohol consumption and, therefore, 
lower income and probable employment losses. 
35 To my knowledge, Dee and Sela (2003) were the first authors to use differences-in-
differences to consider serial correlation in their evaluation of the effectiveness of speed limit 
changes in the USA. 
 35
drunk driving through discouraging alcohol consumption.36 However, this 
might not be the only possible effects of the policy. Another feasible 
consequence could be a reduction in km travelled. This could be caused by 
increased use of public transport or by changing leisure habits (fewer journeys, 
more home meetings, walking longer distances, etc.). In the Appendix (A5) I 
present a preliminary test which suggests that people reduce their alcohol 
consumption when this policy comes into force. However, these preliminary 
results are not conclusive and, consequently, more robust analyses are needed 
for them to be confirmed. 
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A1.a. Identifying assumption test. Estimation results. 
                               Robust 
  ln Rate fat.      Coef.    Std. Err.        t    P>|t| 
 Random checks  0.0143  .0888  0.16     0.874  
 MLDA   0.0126  .0332   -0.38   0.709  
 Points License  0.0159  .04312  0.37     0.717      
 Unemployment  -0.0045 .0034  -1.35     0.199     
 Growth rate  0.0090  .0062  1.44     0.172     
 Motorization  0.0021  .0008  -2.70     0.017     
 Vehicle-km  0.0341  .0437  0.78     0.447    
 Education  0.0066  .0029  2.26     0.040      
 Motorways  -0.0521 .0129  -4.03     0.001 
 National Roads  0.0046  .0030  1.53     0.148     
yeartreated~1991   0.3544  .0632  5.61     0.000      
yearcontrol~1991   0.1585  .1783  0.89     0.389      
yeartreated~1992   0.2957  .0496  5.97     0.000      
yearcontrol~1992   0.1847  .1563  1.18     0.257     
yeartreated~1993   0.2662   .0598  4.45     0.001      
yearcontrol~1993   0.1229  .1372  0.90     0.386     
yeartreated~1994   0.1853   .0482  3.84     0.002      
yearcontrol~1994   0.0522  .1159  0.45     0.659     
yeartreated~1995   0.1868  .0637  2.93     0.011      
yearcontrol~1995   0.0891   .0755  1.18     0.258     
yeartreated~1996   0.1473  .0590  2.50     0.026      
yearcontrol~1996   0.0960  .0523  1.84     0.087     
yeartreated~1997   0.1221  .0461  2.65     0.019      
yearcontrol~1997   0.0834   .0464  1.80     0.094     
yeartreated~1998   0.1275   .0433  2.94     0.011 
 yearcontrol~1998   0.0158  .0435  0.36     0.723 
 yeartreated~1999   0.1060   .0345  3.07     0.008 
 yearcontrol~1999   0.0698  .0435  1.61     0.131 
 yeartreated~2000   0.1047   .0447  2.34     0.035      
 yearcontrol~2000   0.0449  .0449  1.00     0.334     
 yeartreated~2001   0.0999   .0359  2.78     0.015      
 yearcontrol~2001   0.0260   .0556  0.47     0.646      
 yeartreated~2002   0.0561  .0203  2.75     0.016      
 yearcontrol~2002   0.0262  .0325  0.81     0.434     
 constant  4.9012  .3542  13.84    0.000      
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A1.b. Identifying assumption test.  Testing hypothesis. 
H0 :  yeartreated i + yearcontrol i = 0 
H1 :  yeartreated i + yearcontrol i ≠ 0 
Year F-Stat. (1, 14) Prob > F. Stat H0 vs. H1 
1991 1.58 0.2299 H0 
1992 0.73 04066 H0 
1993 1.82 0.1993 H0 
1994 2.24 0.1569 H0 
1995 3.06 0.1021 H0 
1996 1.04 0.3255 H0 
1997 0.66 0.4286 H0 
1998 4.74 0.0471 H1 
1999 0.53 0.4775 H0 
2000 1.12 0.3070 H0 
2001 1.12 0.3079 H0 
2002 0.59 0.4538 H0 
 
 
A2. Pre-treatment time pattern test results. 
       Robust 
ln Rate fat.   Coef.  Std. Err.     t  P>|t| 
Unemployment  -0.0032 0.0027     -1.16  0.266     
Growth rate   0.0089  0.0051       1.73  0.105     
Motorization   -0.0018 0.0007     -2.57  0.022     
Vehicle-km   0.0377  0.0452       0.83  0.418     
Education   0.0049  0.0030       1.64  0.123     
Motorways   -0.0508 0.0110      -4.63  0.000     
National Roads  0.0036  0.0023       1.59  0.134     
MLDA    -0.0117 0.0253      -0.46  0.650     
Points License  -0.0002 0.0384      -0.01  0.996     
Random   -0.0034 0.0758     -0.05  0.965     
Before02   0.0145  0.0240       0.61  0.554     
Before+3   0.0159  0.0362       0.44  0.667    
This model also uses year-specific national fixed effects and state-specific fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are given.  
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A3. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. Age group and urban 
fatality rates (selected results). 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same two-way fixed effects model is applied to these groups of victims. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
A4. Least-squares estimates for semi-log models. Age group and non-urban 
fatality rates (selected results). 
 
The same two-way fixed effects model is applied to these groups of victims. Cluster-robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Independent  
  Variables 
Urban  
Age 20-29 
(21) 
Urban 
Age 30-39 
 (22) 
Urban 
Age 40-49 
(23) 
Urban 
Age 50-59 
(24) 
 BAC0.5 
 
    -0.2830**    
 (0.0972) 
 
-0.0370   
 (0.1196) 
 
-0.1074   
 (0.0724) 
 
-0.1319  
 (0.0763) 
 BAC0.5 + 
 Random Checks 
 
    -0.2947**   
 (0.1031) 
 
-0.0531   
 (0.1167) 
 
 -0.1246*   
 (0.0677) 
 
-0.1310   
 (0.0750) 
 Independent  
 Variables 
Non-Urban  
Age 20-29 
(25) 
Non-Urban 
Age 30-39 
 (26) 
Non-Urban 
Age 40-49 
(27) 
Non-Urban  
Age 50-59 
(28) 
 BAC0.5 
 
-0.0341     
 (0.0561) 
 
-0.1200*  
  (0.0635) 
 
-0.0124    
(0.0467) 
 
-0.0883   
 (0.0908) 
 BAC0.5 + 
 Random Checks 
 
-0.0341     
(0.0561) 
 
-0.1014  
 (0.0584) 
 
0.0007   
 (0.0511) 
 
-0.0883   
 (0.0908) 
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A5. Least-squares estimates, semi-log model. Alcohol consumption. 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Alcohol Consumption 
(29) 
 
BAC0.5 
 
-0.0656** 
(0.0297) 
 
Points License 
 
0.0338* 
(0.0174) 
 
MLDA 
 
-0.0687 
(0.0615) 
 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0038) 
 
Growth rate 
 
0.0033 
(0.0023) 
 
R-sq 
 
0.50 
   Two-way fixed effects model for alcohol consumption. Standard errors allowing clustering by country 
    are given in parenthesis.  
 
 
